Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2021

Same Standard, Different Outcomes: A Critique on Daubert and
Expert Admissibility Standards Through the Lens of the Talcum
Powder Mass Tort Litigation
Deanna Lee

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

SAME STANDARD, DIFFERENT OUTCOMES: A CRITIQUE ON DAUBERT AND
EXPERT ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS THROUGH THE LENS OF THE TALCUM
POWDER MASS TORT LITIGATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

For decades, scholars, commentators, and courts have debated the wisdom of the
standards used for evaluating expert witnesses. With courts around the country grappling with
the mass tort litigation concerning talcum powder (“talc litigation”), and as a result of using
different standards to evaluate – and in some cases exclude – the same experts, the cases present
a unique opportunity to consider the issue. The standard used for evaluating experts in federal
courts, and some state courts, has developed through common law overtime and is codified in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.1 The expert admissibility standard, commonly known as the Daubert
Standard, has long been critiqued by experts in the field. However, most of the examinations of
the Daubert Standard are based on one-off cases.
The talcum powder mass tort litigation presents a unique view of the shortcomings of the
Daubert Standard due to its widespread nature and presence in the media.2 The litigation is
based on the premise that the talc products – Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder and Shower to
Shower – cause ovarian cancer.3 There were more than 15,500 cases pending against Johnson &

1

See e.g., Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993); GE v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Federal
Rule of Evidence 702.
2
See e.g., Peter Loftus, Johnson & Johnson’s Legal Challenges Mount, The Wall Street Journal (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/johnson-johnsons-legal-challenges-mount-11571055242; Chad Terhune, Johnson &
Johnson CEO testified Baby Powder was safe 13 days before FDA bombshell, Reuters (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-talc-ceo-insight/johnson-johnson-ceo-testified-baby-powderwas-safe-13-days-before-fda-bombshell-idUSKBN1X12GF; Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Johnson & Johnson earnings
beat expectations despite legal challenges from opioids and talc, CNBC (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/15/johnson-johnson-jnj-earnings-q3-2019.html; Lauren Berg, J&J Hit With $40M
Verdict In Calif. Talc Cancer Trial, Law360 (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1201417/j-j-hitwith-40m-verdict-in-calif-talc-cancer-trial.
3
Johnson & Johnson, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 31 (June 30, 2019).
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Johnson talc products as of June 2019.4 Due to the expansive nature of the talc litigation, the
same experts have repeatedly been offered in different courts across the country.5 This means
the same expert can face multiple challenges to their credibility and methodology in Daubert
Hearings as well as under other expert standards, such as the Frye Standard, in front of different
judges in different jurisdictions. To trigger a Daubert Hearing, the opposing party moves to
exclude an expert’s testimony based on one of the five Daubert Factors. The pitfalls of the
expert standard become evident when one court allows an expert to give opinions and findings
while a different court excludes that same testimony.6
This comment will discuss the evolution of the Daubert Standard and the issues courts
and litigants face in light of the expert admissibility standards using the talc litigation as a case
study. Part II gives a brief history of the different standards adopted by federal and states courts
through common law and the legislature. It further discusses some of the most substantial
critiques of the Daubert Standard since the Supreme Court’s holding more than two decades ago.
Part III explores the talc litigation and gives a broad overview of its claims, nature, size, and
presence in the media. Part IV presents a case study which looks at several experts whose
testimony has been excluded in some courts while allowed in other courts based on the expert
standard applied, whether Daubert or other admissibility criteria. Part V will discuss the
shortcomings of the Daubert Standard as demonstrated through the case studies and review
proffered solutions to the issue. In addition, this section acknowledges the issue of courts

4

Id.
See e.g., Carl v. Johnson & Johnson, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2102 (calling Dr. Colditz and Dr. Cramer as
expert witnesses); Ristesund v. Johnson & Johnson, 22nd Judicial Circuit of Missouri, Case No. 1422-CC09012-01
(calling Dr. Colditz as an expert witness); Blaes v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:14CV213 RLW, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6399 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2016) (calling Dr. Colditz as an expert witness); Berg v. Johnson & Johnson, 940 F.
Supp. 2d 983 (D.S.D. 2013) (calling Dr. Cramer as an expert witness).
6
Carrie Salls & John O’Brien, In One State, Testimony 'Made For Litigation'; In Another, Part Of $127M In
Verdicts, Forbes (Sept 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2016/09/21/in-one-state-testimonymade-for-litigation-in-another-part-of-127m-in-verdicts/#3d29425c8b50.
5
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applying different expert admissibility standards outside of Daubert, such as Frye, and reaching
different conclusions about the same expert testimony.
II.

EVOLUTION OF THE EXPERT STANDARD

For seventy years, until the Supreme Court’s holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, the traditional standard for assessing expert admissibility was historically
known as the Frye Standard, which originated in a 1923 District of Columbia Circuit case.7 The
Frye Standard was then largely used by state and federal courts until the Supreme Court
developed the Daubert Standard in 1993.8 The Daubert Standard was later clarified in 1997 and
1999 with regards to the appellate standard of review and the Standard’s application to
nonscientific expert testimony.9 In 2000, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was updated in response
to Daubert.10
A. The Expert Testimony Standard Developed from Frye v. United States Was
an Attempt at Creating a Way to Assess Expert Credibility.
Under the Frye Standard expert testimony is necessary when the answer to a question lies
outside the scope of a lay person’s knowledge.11 Unlike the modern standard, the Frye Standard
did not set forth factors to weigh or analyze when determining the admissibility of expert
testimony, rather it relied solely on whether or not an expert’s opinion was generally accepted as
reliable in the scientific community.12 Although handed down in 1923, the Frye Standard was
not actively used by the courts until the 1970s.13 The Frye Standard was originally only used in

7

Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
9
GE v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1999)
10
FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee Notes.
11
Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
12
Id.
13
Anjelica Cappellino, Daubert vs. Frye: Navigating the Standards of Admissibility for Expert Testimony, THE
EXPERT INSTITUTE (July 17, 2018), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-vs-frye-navigating-the-standards-ofadmissibility-for-expert-testimony/
8
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criminal trials, however it was later applied to most civil cases as well. 14 When evaluating expert
testimony in toxic tort litigation, many different standards were applied.15 While some courts
applied Frye to the litigations, other courts used a stricter interpretation of the original Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, while some even adopted a “let-it-all-in” philosophy.16 As a result of the
different interpretations and applications, the Frye Standard was often criticized as too vague,
which eventually led to the development of the modern standard in Daubert in 1993.17
B. The Supreme Court Addressed the Concern Surrounding Expert Testimony
and Developed the Daubert Standard.
The Daubert Standard was handed down from the United States Supreme Court in
1993.18 The case revolved around birth defects allegedly caused by drugs manufactured by the
defendant and ingested by the mothers during pregnancy.19 One of the plaintiffs experts in
Daubert intended to testify to the alleged drug-caused birth defects, but his testimony was
excluded by the district court.20 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision citing the
Frye Standard, which accepted testimony only if it was sufficiently established that the methods
and findings were generally accepted.21 The Ninth Circuit found the expert’s testimony was not
generally accepted in the scientific community and thus was inadmissible. 22 On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment finding the excluded evidence should have

14

Id.
David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27,
35-40 (2013).
16
David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It’s Time to Amend Federal Rule Of Evidence 702, 57
WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1, 4 (2015); David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert
Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 40 (2013).
17
David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It’s Time to Amend Federal Rule Of Evidence 702, 57
William & Mary L. Rev. 1, 4 (2015); David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert
Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 40 (2013).
18
Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
19
Id.
20
Id. at 583-84.
21
Id. at 584.
22
Id. at 584.
15
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been admissible.23 In its decision, the Supreme Court relied on five factors, instead of the
generally accepted standard from Frye. 24 The factors include whether there is: (1) a valid and
repeatable scientific experiment; (2) a peer reviewed or published study, (3) a standard which
controls the theory; (4) a known or potential rate of error; and (5) a widespread acceptance of the
findings in the scientific community.25 The five factors may be considered and weighed against
one another, but they need not all be addressed if the situation does not warrant an element.26
Because the factors are weighed under Daubert instead of solely relying on general acceptance in
the scientific community, the Daubert Standard evaluates expert testimony more broadly and in
theory allows in more expert testimony so long as other factors are sufficiently met.
Under the Daubert Standard, judges serve as gatekeepers in reviewing an expert’s
intended testimony, prior to allowing it at trial, to sort out “junk science.”27 The gatekeeper role
stems from the idea a jury full of lay people may not be able to discern what complex scientific
testimony is credible and what is not.28 In its opinion the Supreme Court noted the Daubert
Standard was meant to give more power to juries and that rigorous cross-examination of experts
was a better alternative than excluding their testimony altogether.29 However, the gatekeeping
role in turn has created the assumption that judges are better suited to sort through complex
scientific issues.30 While the Supreme Court in its opinion intended the Daubert Standard to
give more power to juries, its emphasis on the gatekeeping role has been at the forefront of the

23

Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993).
Id. at 594.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 596-97; FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee Notes.
28
What Daubert Means For Product Liability Cases In Missouri, Law360 (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1004000/what-daubert-means-for-product-liability-cases-in-missouri.
29
Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1993).
30
See e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 84 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1988
(1996).
24
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Standard’s application instead. Although the Supreme Court indicated the Daubert Standard and
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 were meant to invoke a flexible inquiry into expert testimony,
some courts have taken a different interpretation in finding Daubert is more strict and imposes a
higher level of scrutiny than Frye.31 As a result of this rift, courts’ application of the Daubert
Standard is vulnerable to a lack of uniformity, which can result in the same expert’s testimony
being admitted in one court and excluded in another.
C. Other Cases Which Clarify the Daubert Standard
Although the Daubert Standard was created by the Supreme Court to clarify the previous
expert admissibility standard, their opinion created new questions including what the standard of
review on appeal is and how Daubert applies to nonscientific expert testimony. In Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court held the Daubert Standard should not be restricted to only
evaluating scientific experts and should be used in determining the admissibility of any expert’s
testimony.32 The Supreme Court also ruled in General Electric Co. v. Joiner that Daubert
applies not only to the expert’s methodology, but to their reasoning as well.33
It is important to note the standard of review on appeal regarding issues of expert
admissibility. The issue was first addressed in general terms of evidentiary rulings.34 The trial
judge must determine that expert testimony, findings, and opinions are not only relevant, but also

31

Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993); Hall v. Baxter, No. 92-182, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18960, 39 (D. Or. Dec.18,
1996).
32
The decision in Kumho Tire was a result of a circuit split where some courts only applied Daubert to scientific
experts as specified in the previous version of Rule 702 while other courts applied Daubert to nonscientific experts
as well like economists and psychologists. Anjelica Cappellino, Daubert vs. Frye: Navigating the Standards of
Admissibility for Expert Testimony, THE EXPERT INSTITUTE (July 17, 2018),
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-vs-frye-navigating-the-standards-of-admissibility-for-expert-testimony/.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court finding the trial judge incorrectly applied the Daubert Standard to a
nonscientific expert in tire failure. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). The Supreme Court then reversed the
circuit court’s decision holding the Daubert Standard applied to both scientific testimony as well as technical or
other specialized testimony from non-scientists. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1999). Id.
33
GE, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997).
34
GE, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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reliable.35 The Eleventh Circuit in General Electric applied a standard of review greater than
abuse of discretion because they believed under the Daubert Standard the evidence was
admissible.36 The Supreme Court clarified Daubert did not change or address the abuse of
discretion standard that must be applied when assessing evidentiary rulings on appeal.37 The
appellate court may only overturn a decision under Daubert if there is abuse of discretion or
plain error.38 In other words, trial judges have broad discretion under Daubert in deciding what
expert testimony is admissible and what testimony is excludable.39 Since the accepted standard
of review is abuse of discretion, appellate judges may not categorically distinguish between
lower court rulings that allow expert testimony and those which exclude it.40 Therefore, the
appellate court must review exclusions and admissions of expert testimony in the same manner,
with the same abuse of discretion standard.41 In some cases this means two different judges can
look at the same expert witness, testimony, and opinions and come to different conclusions and
the different decisions will likely not be overturned on appeal due to the abuse of discretion
standard.
D. Most States Follow the Daubert Standard, While Others Remain on the Frye
Standard or Their Own Unique Method of Assessing Credibility.
While federal courts are required to apply the Daubert Standard under the doctrine of
stare decisis, state courts are not similarly bound.42 The state courts in Nevada, North Dakota,

35

Id.
Joiner v. GE, 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996).
37
GE, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
38
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
39
Id.
40
GE, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
41
Id.
42
Stare Decisis, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining stare decisis as the doctrine of precedent where a
court must follow earlier judicial decisions); David L. Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74
NW. U. L. REV. 759, 771 (1979) (reiterating state courts are not bound by lower federal courts because “[lower]
federal courts are no more than coordinate with the state courts on issues of federal law”).
36
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and Virginia use their own standard for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony.43 The
state courts in California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington
use the Frye Standard, or something very similar.44 Florida state courts at one time applied the
Daubert Standard, but recently returned back to the Frye Standard following a State Supreme
Court decision in an attempt to reduce the confusion created by the Daubert Standard.45 All
other unlisted state courts have adopted the Daubert Standard in some fashion.46 States have
adopted the Daubert Standard in different ways. For example, New Jersey adopted the Standard
through a landmark decision in the Accutane Litigation in 2018.47 On the other hand, the
Missouri State Legislature adopted the Daubert Standard by revising their state statute governing
expert admissibility to mirror Daubert in 2017.48
1. New Jersey Adopted the Daubert Standard in a Landmark State
Supreme Court Decision in 2018.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently adopted a standard similar to Daubert in the
Accutane Litigation in 2018.49 The state stopped short of saying they adopted the full Daubert
Standard, but the factors are now incorporated into how New Jersey courts are to assess expert

Michael Morgenstern, Daubert v. Frye – A State-by-State Comparison, THE EXPERT INSTITUTE (April 3, 2017),
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v-frye-a-state-by-state-comparison/.
44
Id.
45
DeLisle v. Crane Co., 258 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2018); Sean McDonough & Jacqueline Bertelsen, Frye Is Now, and
Once Again, the Standard for Expert Opinion Admissibility in Florida, WILSONELSER (Oct, 25, 2018),
https://www.productliabilityadvocate.com/2018/10/frye-is-now-and-once-again-the-standard-for-expert-opinionadmissibility-in-florida/.
46
Michael Morgenstern, Daubert v. Frye – A State-by-State Comparison, THE EXPERT INSTITUTE (April 3, 2017),
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v-frye-a-state-by-state-comparison/.
47
In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340 (2018) (adopting an expert admissibility standard that is effectively thought of
as the Daubert Standard.).
48
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065 (removing “reasonably relied upon” criteria of the old statute replacing it with a
heightened requirement where the court must find a series of factors mirroring the Daubert Standard).
49
Tara L. Pehush, David A. Fusco & Jake Morrison, Taking Out the “Junk”: New Jersey Supreme Court Adopts
Daubert “Factors” in Landmark Decision on Scientific Evidence, NAT. L. REV. (Feb,. 21, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/taking-out-junk-new-jersey-supreme-court-adopts-daubert-factors-landmarkdecision.
43
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admissibility.50 However, the state supreme court emphasized the importance of the gatekeeping
role judges play in civil cases.51 Prior to adopting the Daubert Standard, New Jersey courts
followed a standard set forth in Kemp v. State.52 The Kemp Standard and the Daubert Standard
both had the same goal of keeping out “junk science,” but they differed on whether the judge or
the jurors should decide the credibility of an expert’s testimony.53 In the Accutane Litigation,
the trial court excluded plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony, but the Appellate Division reversed the
decision finding the more liberal Kemp Standard made the testimony admissible.54 On appeal,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division and affirmed the trial court all
while adopting the new judge-driven standard.55 New Jersey demonstrated one way courts have
adopted the Daubert Standard through common law and the doctrine of stare decisis.
2. Missouri Adopted the Daubert Standard Through Legislation Signed
into Law and Enacted in 2017.
Missouri, like New Jersey, also adopted the Daubert Standard in 2017.56 Unlike New
Jersey, Missouri’s change in standard did not result from a state supreme court decision, instead

50

Timothy I. Duffy, Mark K. Silver, Joseph C. Amoroso, Joseph P. Fiteni, & Maryam M. Meseha, New Jersey
Supreme Court Embraces Use Of Daubert Factors To Determine Admissibility Of Expert Opinion, COUGHLIN
DUFFY (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.coughlinduffy.com/news-events/new-jersey-supreme-court-embraces-use-ofdaubert-factors-to-determine-admissibility-of-expert-opinion; Tara L. Pehush, David A. Fusco & Jake Morrison,
Taking Out the “Junk”: New Jersey Supreme Court Adopts Daubert “Factors” in Landmark Decision on Scientific
Evidence, NAT. L. REV. (Feb,. 21, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/taking-out-junk-new-jerseysupreme-court-adopts-daubert-factors-landmark-decision.
51
In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 347-48 (2018).
52
Kemp v. State, 174 N.J. 412, 427 (2002).
53
Bill Wichert, Roche May Test Liberal NJ Expert Standard In Accutane Battle, LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/950548/roche-may-test-liberal-nj-expert-standard-in-accutane-battle.
54
In re Accutane Litig., 165 A.3d 832 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017); In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 347-48
(2018).
55
Bill Wichert, Roche May Test Liberal NJ Expert Standard In Accutane Battle, LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/950548/roche-may-test-liberal-nj-expert-standard-in-accutane-battle.
56
Nicole C. Behnen, Aaron Chickos & Luke J. Mangan, Missouri Adopts Daubert Standard Governing
Admissibility of Expert Opinion Evidence, NAT. L. REV. (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/missouri-adopts-daubert-standard-governing-admissibility-expert-opinionevidence.
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the state passed legislation to update its existing expert admissibility statute.57 The revised
statute, Missouri Revised Statute § 490.065, lays out the Daubert Factors and reaffirms the
judge’s gatekeeping role.58 Prior to the revision, the relevant portion of the statute regarding
expert admissibility read:
The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to
him at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject and must be otherwise reasonably reliable.59
Missouri’s updated expert admissibility statute removed the “reasonably relied upon”
criteria and in its place are Daubert Factors.60 The current version of the Missouri statute reads:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the
expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in
the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or
data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be
admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data
would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may
disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the
jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial
effect.61
The Missouri legislature had tried to adopt the Daubert Standard in 2016, however the
legislation was vetoed by then Governor Jay Nixon in 2016.62 Missouri courts had previously

57

Nicole C. Behnen, Aaron Chickos & Luke J. Mangan, Missouri Adopts Daubert Standard Governing
Admissibility of Expert Opinion Evidence, NAT. L. REV. (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/missouri-adopts-daubert-standard-governing-admissibility-expert-opinionevidence.
58
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065.
59
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through 100th General Assembly, Legislation effective
through August 28, 2019, and the first extra session).
60
Nicole C. Behnen, Aaron Chickos & Luke J. Mangan, Missouri Adopts Daubert Standard Governing
Admissibility of Expert Opinion Evidence, NAT. L. REV. (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/missouri-adopts-daubert-standard-governing-admissibility-expert-opinionevidence.
61
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065.
62
Nicole C. Behnen, Aaron Chickos & Luke J. Mangan, Missouri Adopts Daubert Standard Governing
Admissibility of Expert Opinion Evidence, NAT. L. REV. (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/missouri-adopts-daubert-standard-governing-admissibility-expert-opinionevidence.
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been known as a plaintiff-friendly system.63 One of the goals behind the new expert
admissibility legislation was to reduce the “Judicial Hellhole” environment in Missouri, as noted
by the American Tort Reform Foundation.64 Critics of the Daubert Standard are worried the
standard will require judges to decide complex scientific issues outside their area of expertise.65
This issue will be further explored using the talc litigation as a case study.
E. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Confusion Following the Amendment, and
Courts Creating Their Own Standard.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended seven years after Daubert was decided and
outlines when an expert may testify.66 The purpose of the amendment was to codify a more
rigorous approach to evaluating expert testimony.67 The current version of Rule 702 reads:
“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.”68
In Daubert, the Supreme Court noted Rule 702 “requires a valid scientific connection to
the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.”69 But at the time the Daubert decision
was handed down, Rule 702 was different than it is today. Rule 702, at the time Daubert was

Maggie Hummel, Missouri’s New Expert Witness Statute, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY L. J.,
https://www.slu.edu/law/law-journal/online/2017-18/missouri-new-expert-witness-statute.php (Nov. 2, 2019).
64
American Tort Reform Foundation, Judicial Hellholes 2016-2017, http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/JudicialHellholes-2016.pdf.
65
Maggie Hummel, Missouri’s New Expert Witness Statute, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY L. J.,
https://www.slu.edu/law/law-journal/online/2017-18/missouri-new-expert-witness-statute.php (Nov. 2, 2019).
66
Report Of The Advisory Committee On Evidence Rules To The Standing Committee On Rules Of Practice And
Procedure, 5-7 (May 1, 1999).
67
Id. at 7.
68
FED. R. EVID. 702.
69
Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
63
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handed down, read “If scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.”70 As such, courts will occasionally use the old version of Rule 702
rather than the post-2000 amended rule.71 In fact, some courts have disregarded the language of
Rule 702 altogether in favor of their own interpretation of the Daubert Standard.72
For example, in litigation alleging contaminated baby formula, the district court excluded
plaintiff’s expert’s testimony.73 On appeal the Eighth Circuit adopted their own interpretation of
Rule 702 by boiling it down to a three-part test:
First, evidence based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge must be useful to the finder of fact in deciding the
ultimate issue of fact. This is the basic rule of relevancy. Second,
the proposed witness must be qualified to assist the finder of fact.
Third, the proposed evidence must be reliable or trustworthy in an
evidentiary sense, so that, if the finder of fact accepts it as true, it
provides the assistance the finder of fact requires.74
This three-part test came from several cases which can be traced back to an evidence
treatise authored by Margaret Berger.75 Berger was a leading critic for stricter rules for expert
admissibility, especially in toxic tort litigation.76

70

Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1937 (1975) (establishing the Federal Rules of Evidence).
David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It’s Time to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 57
William & Mary L. Rev. 1, 24 (2015).
72
Id. at 19-24.
73
Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, 754 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2014).
74
Id. at 561; Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2001).
75
Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, 754 F.3d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Polski v. Quigley Corp., 538
F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2008)) (citing Lauzon v. Senco Products, Inc., . 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2001)) (citing
Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 702App.01 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed.,
Matthew Bender & Co. 2d ed. 2015)).
76
Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT I) S59,
S59-61 (2005).
71
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The Ninth Circuit also adopted its own interpretation of Rule 702.77 It completely ignores
Rule 702(d) which reads, “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.” 78 In place of Rule 702(d) the Ninth Circuit held the judge as a gatekeeper must
determine the reliability of the methodology, but leave the question of whether the expert
reliably applied the methodology to the jury.79
The amended version of Rule 702 affirmed the idea the judge is a gatekeeper, but also
required the judge take a more managerial role regarding expert admissibility.80 The various
interpretations courts are taking with regards to Rule 702 have created an atmosphere where
expert admissibility standards are applied without uniformity. The lack of uniformity can result
in an expert’s testimony being accepted by one court, while the same expert’s testimony may be
rejected by another court.
III.

TALCUM POWDER LITIGATION

The talcum powder litigation, specifically regarding ovarian cancer, is based around talc
products such as Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder and Shower to Shower.81 The plaintiffs
allege all claims are a “direct and proximate result of Defendants’ and/or their corporate
predecessors negligent, willful, and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling,
and/or sale of the products.”82 The named Defendants usually include Johnson & Johnson,
Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., Imerys Talc America, Inc., and Personal Care
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Products Council.83 In the short form complaints filed by Plaintiffs in the Multidistrict litigation
in New Jersey, there are up to twenty-three claims against the Defendants including failure to
warn, manufacturers and design defects, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied
warranty among others.84 Imerys Talc America filed for Chapter 11 protection in February 2019
in light of the widespread litigation.85 The Defendants maintain that the talc and talc products do
not include asbestos and are not inherently dangerous.86 Because the Plaintiffs and Defendants
allege opposite scientific findings, they both have experts to support their claims. The experts all
employ various scientific tests and statistical analyses to support their conclusions and are thus
evaluated for credibility and reliable methodology during Daubert Hearings. The dispute is
rooted in plaintiffs’ experts asserting talc causes inflammation, which in turn causes ovarian
cancer, and the presence of asbestos in talc; Defense experts maintain the exact opposite. Each
expert usually develops a report based on their research, potential experiments, and conclusions
in order to satisfy the Daubert Standard, or the expert admissibility standard used in the forum.87
The opposing opinions, supported by science and statistical analyses, make Daubert Hearings
even more complex.
A. Johnson & Johnson’s Talc Cases and Where They Are Being Filed
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Johnson & Johnson is one of many companies facing lawsuits as a result of its talcum
powder products. The first high profile talc litigation involving Johnson & Johnson was an
ovarian cancer suit in 2013.88 According to Johnson & Johnson’s second report released in June
2019, there are 15,500 cases pending in talc litigation.89 To put the growth of the litigation into
perspective, Johnson & Johnson’s first quarter report in 2016 – just three years prior – included
1,400 cases pending in the talc litigation.90 As of May 2014 there were two class action suits
pending against the company in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California and United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.91 As of 2019, the
cases filed in federal court have been organized into a multidistrict litigation in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey.92 Cases not filed in federal court are primarily
being filed in Missouri, New Jersey, and California in addition to those filed outside the United
States.93
B. The Talc Litigation’s Appearance in the Media.
The media has consistently reported on the massive litigation, with multiple articles being
released every day.94 The first highly publicized jury trial took place in early 2016 in St. Louis
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Missouri where a woman was awarded $72 million in damages.95 A Los Angeles court ordered
Johnson & Johnson pay $417 million in damages in August 2017.96 In July 2018, a Missouri
state court awarded a group of twenty-two women $4.14 billion in punitive damages in addition
to the $550 million award for their ovarian cancer claims.97 In May 2019, a New York state
court ordered Johnson & Johnson to pay $300 million in punitive damages to a single
mesothelioma plaintiff on top of the $20 million for pain and suffering.98
C. The Talc Litigation Requires Judges to Assess Many Different Types of
Scientific and Non-Scientific Experts Along with Their Complex Analyses.
As a result of the highly technical and scientific nature of the claims against the defendants,
both the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee, a group of plaintiffs and their attorneys, who led the
litigation, and the defendants have hired many experts. For example, in the District of New
Jersey the talc multidistrict litigation had experts in fields such as cancer biology, gynecologic
oncology, toxicology, epidemiology, and asbestos in talc.99 In total, the Plaintiffs’ Steering
Committee had twenty-two experts and defendant Johnson & Johnson had seventeen experts.100
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Despite the large number of experts on both sides, the Daubert Hearings in the District of New
Jersey were ultimately restricted to five Plaintiff experts and three Johnson & Johnson experts.101
A topic of constant discussion with the experts in the talcum powder litigation is the
Bradford Hill Analysis.102 The Bradford Hill Criteria, authored by Sir Austin Bradford Hill,
consists of nine viewpoints to help ascertain if associations are causal.103 The Criteria assess the
strength of association, consistency, specificity, temporality, biological gradient, plausibility,
coherence, experiment, and analogy of the observed experiment.104 The Bradford Hill Criteria
are just one way for an expert, and perhaps a court in Daubert hearings to assess the findings and
opinions regarding association and causation. Causation is the key issue in the talc litigation.
Plaintiffs’ experts have alleged there is asbestos, a known carcinogen, in the talc which causes
ovarian cancer.105 Plaintiffs’ experts also contend talc, on its own, causes ovarian cancer
regardless of if asbestos is present in the mineral powder due to the nonasbestiform mineral
fibers.106 Meanwhile, Defendants’ experts claim there is no association between talcum powder
and the development of ovarian cancer. 107 In addition, Defendants’ experts maintain there is no
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asbestos in the tested talc products.108 The Bradford Hill Criteria, largely used in the field of
epidemiology, are just one example of the highly technical landscape judges encounter in
Daubert Hearings.
D. The Talc Litigation Demonstrates the Difficulty Courts Have in
Differentiating Between the Daubert Standard and the Frye Standard.
The adoption of the Daubert Standard is not mandatory for state courts; while all federal
courts follow the Daubert Standard, some state courts still follow the Frye Standard or their own
expert admissibility standard.109 The difference between the Daubert Standard and the Frye
Standard was demonstrated recently in the talc litigation. New York State still uses the Frye
Standard whereas the federal courts, like the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, follow the Daubert Standard. 110 One expert who has testified in the talc litigation in
multiple courts is Dr. Ronald Gordon. Dr. Gordon, a pathologist and microscopist, has testified
in federal and state courts on asbestos and talc related matters.111
On August 5, 2019 Judge Hogan of the District Court for the District of Columbia, using
the Daubert Standard, excluded expert Dr. Gordon’s testimony. 112 Judge Hogan cited Dr.
Gordon’s faulty research method, which failed to account for false positives, as the reasoning
behind the exclusion.113 A Georgia state court, also following the Daubert Standard, excluded
Dr. Gordon’s testimony as well once again citing his unorthodox methodology and issues with
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replicability.114 The judge in Georgia also alluded to issues with the expert’s creditability
referencing criminal activity in the 1990s involving drugs and money laundering.115
A New York State Supreme Court, on the other hand, allowed Dr. Gordon’s same expert
testimony, despite the Judge acknowledging another court in a Frye jurisdiction had excluded his
testimony. 116 The other Frye court, a Pennsylvania state court, excluded Dr. Gordon’s testimony
in a Frye Hearing in 2017.117 The Pennsylvania court excluded Dr. Gordon’s testimony for the
same reasons as the Daubert courts did: Dr. Gordon’s faulty methodology and failure to follow
an acceptable protocol for testing.118
The difference between the Frye Standard and Daubert Standard is difficult to discern as
seen through the lens of Dr. Gordon testifying in the talc litigation. At first glance it appears the
difference between the Frye and Daubert Standards is substantial enough that one standard
allows testimony while the other excludes the same opinions and methodologies; however,
because two states under the Frye Standard came to different conclusions about the same
expert’s testimony the boundaries are further blurred. Dr. Gordon’s testimony indicates a larger
issue with expert admissibility. The Supreme Court in Daubert noted the new expert
admissibility standard was supposed to be more flexible, however the exclusion of Dr. Gordon’s
testimony under Daubert and not necessarily under Frye sends a different message.
IV.

CASE STUDIES
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The talc litigation provides a lens through which the issues with the Daubert Standard
and other expert admissibility standards can be seen. A great level of public scrutiny is present in
the talc litigation because of its constant presence in the media and the sheer number of cases
filed nationwide. The disparity amongst courts concerning admissibility of expert testimony
could result in disparate outcomes for plaintiffs and increase forum shopping by future claimants.
This is exactly what happened in 2013 and 2016.119 This section will discuss the admission and
exclusion of expert testimony by Dr. Graham Colditz, an expert in cancer epidemiology, and Dr.
Daniel Cramer, an expert in Obstetrics & Gynecology, Ovarian Cancer, Clinical Epidemiology,
and Reproductive Sciences.120
A. Dr. Colditz Attempted to Testify in Both Missouri and New Jersey in the
Talcum Powder Litigation in 2016 Before Both States Adopted the Daubert
Standard; New Jersey Excluded His Testimony While Missouri Allowed it.
Dr. Colditz is an expert in cancer epidemiology from Australia.121 Dr. Colditz served on
numerous editorial boards for scientific journals, taught at universities including Harvard
University and University of Queensland, and published many articles concerning cancer
epidemiology.122 Dr. Colditz testified for plaintiffs in the talc litigation in courts including the
New Jersey Superior Court in Atlantic County and the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis in
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the State of Missouri.123 At the time New Jersey followed the Kemp Standard for expert
admissibility while Missouri followed its own state statute for expert admissibility.124 Dr.
Colditz testified in both Missouri and New Jersey expert admissibility hearings as to his
epidemiological findings and opinions as they related to talc causing ovarian cancer.125 In his
testimony, Dr. Colditz relied on the Bradford Hill Criteria.126 Dr. Colditz used the Bradford Hill
Criteria to “prove cause and effect” calling it the “bread and butter” of epidemiologists.127 Dr.
Colditz noted that one study on its own will not prove causality, but a whole sequence of studies
can such as the one Dr. Cramer, another plaintiffs’ expert, created in 1982.128
1. The New Jersey Superior Court Excluded Dr. Colditz’s Expert
Testimony on September 2, 2016.
Judge Nelson Johnson of the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Atlantic County
presided over the talc litigation involving lead plaintiffs Brandi Carl and Diana Balderrama.129
Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Imerys Talc America filed a motion to exclude Dr. Colditz’s
expert testimony and for summary judgment in the event the testimony was excluded.130 The
experts in the New Jersey case were evaluated under the Kemp Standard meaning Judge Johnson
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was required to evaluate whether the theory of causation was acceptable under the standard.131
The Kemp Standard was more relaxed in that “a theory of causation that had not yet reached
general acceptance in the scientific community ‘may be found to be sufficiently reliable if it is
based on a sound, adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of
the type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field.’"132
Judge Johnson found Dr. Colditz was qualified in terms of background and education,
however the doctor failed to show the "data or information used were soundly and reliably
generated and were of a type reasonably relied upon by comparable experts."133 Judge Johnson
was highly critical of the epidemiological expert and plaintiffs’ counsel stating it was as if they
said “look at this, and forget everything else science has to teach us.”134 Judge Johnson also
criticized the heavy reliance on the idea of inflammation and inconsistencies among plaintiffs’
experts findings of inflammation and their relation to causation.135 As a result of the evaluation
of the experts under the Kemp Standard, Judge Johnson granted summary judgement in favor of
the Defendants on September 2, 2016.136 Judge Johnson later stated the testimony had the
hallmarks of a “made-for-litigation presentation.”137
2. The Missouri Circuit Court Allowed Dr. Colditz’s Expert Testimony
on April 12, 2016.
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Missouri also saw a challenge to Dr. Colditz’s testimony in the talc litigation.138
Defendant Johnson & Johnson filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Colditz in the
Gloria Ristesund case on March 10, 2016.139 The court denied Johnson & Johnson’s motion to
exclude on April 12, 2016.140 The expert admissibility standard used at the time allowed an
expert to base his opinion on facts or data “reasonably relied upon by experts in the field” when
forming opinions.141 This flexible and minimal standard, when compared to Daubert, allowed
many experts to testify including Dr. Colditz. 142 Dr. Colditz again relied on the Bradford Hill
Criteria.143 In his testimony, Dr. Colditz only emphasized and relied on those elements of the
Criteria he found “key,” which in total was three of the nine criteria.144 Just as in New Jersey,
Dr. Colditz identified inflammation as the biological mechanism which causes ovarian cancer.145
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and in the final judgment entered on May 17,
2016 the court awarded a total of $5 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in
punitive damages.146 While the trial court found Dr. Colditz’s testimony was allowed under the
Missouri expert admissibility standard, on appeal the appellants claimed the trial court erred in
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admitting the testimony.147 The case was ultimately overturned on jurisdictional grounds
following the Supreme Court decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court.148
As a result of the reversal based on jurisdiction, the appellate court did not respond to appellants
other twelve points raised on appeal, including the error in admitting Dr. Colditz’s “cherrypicked” testimony made for litigation.149
While the testimony of Dr. Colditz was excluded in one state and included in another,
both decisions were well within the bounds of the expert admissibility standards used at the time.
Different standards for expert testimony present a tremendous issue when, in a factually and
legally identical case, litigants can have a $55 million judgement for plaintiff or a summary
judgement for defendant depending on the standard used. In addition to the issues presented by
different expert admissibility standards, there is still a possibility two courts which follow the
Daubert Standard come to different conclusions. In fact, Dr. Colditz’s testimony, while included
by a Missouri state court, was excluded under the Daubert Standard in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.150 The next case study will examine another expert
that was admitted and excluded in different courts while giving the same testimony.
B. Dr. Cramer Attempted to Testify in the United States District Court for the
District of South Dakota and a New Jersey Superior Court, the District
Court Admitted his Testimony Under the Daubert Standard While New
Jersey Excluded it Under the Kemp Standard.
Dr. Daniel Cramer is another expert in epidemiology from Colorado who has testified in
the talc litigation.151 Dr. Cramer has been a professor in epidemiology as well as affiliated with
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multiple gynecologic cancer institutions for many years.152 Dr. Cramer, like Dr. Colditz, testifies
to the association between talc and ovarian cancer based on his understanding of inflammationinduced cancer in addition to the cohort and case control studies available.153 Dr. Cramer has
testified at cases across the country, including the United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota where his testimony was admitted and the New Jersey Superior Court, Law
Division, Atlantic County, where his testimony was excluded.154
1. Dr. Cramer’s Testimony was Admitted in the United States District
Court for the District of South Dakota Under the Daubert Standard
Following a Daubert Decision on April 12, 2013.
Dr. Cramer was allowed to testify in the talc litigation the United States District Court for
the District of South Dakota following a Daubert Decision on April 12, 2013.155 The South
Dakota District Court followed the Daubert Standard when evaluating Dr. Cramer’s
testimony.156 Defendant’s main argument to exclude Dr. Cramer’s testimony regarded the
reliability of the testimony and methodology.157 The court noted the Daubert Standard only
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allowed them to evaluate admissibility not sufficiency of the evidence to prove causation.158 In
admitting the testimony the court addressed Dr. Cramer’s alleged failure to rule out alternative
causes of the cancer and Dr. Cramer’s allegedly unreliable methodology when analyzing odds
ratios.159 Ultimately the court admitted Dr. Cramer’s testimony using a fact-sensitive analysis
after determining that Dr. Cramer did address alternative causes and the methods regarding the
odds ratios were reliable enough to pass the Daubert threshold although defendant’s could
certainly attack the reliability at trial.160
In utilizing the Daubert Standard, the court did not address the five factors laid out by
the Supreme Court, instead the court used the three-part test employed by the Eighth Circuit.161
The three-part test as discussed earlier states
First, evidence based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge must be useful to the finder of fact in deciding the
ultimate issue of fact. This is the basic rule of relevancy. Second,
the proposed witness must be qualified to assist the finder of fact.
Third, the proposed evidence must be reliable or trustworthy in an
evidentiary sense, so that, if the finder of fact accepts it as true, it
provides the assistance the finder of fact requires. 162
The three-part test is based on an evidence treatise authored by strict-standard-critic
Margaret Berger.163 This further demonstrates the inconsistencies and issues associated with the
Daubert Standard’s flexible application.
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2. Dr. Cramer’s Testimony was Excluded in a New Jersey Superior
Court Under the Kemp Standard Following a Decision on September
2, 2016.
Judge Nelson Johnson of the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Atlantic County
presided over the talc litigation involving lead plaintiffs Brandi Carl and Diana Balderrama.164
Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Imerys Talc America filed a motion to exclude Dr. Cramer’s
expert testimony and for summary judgement in the event the testimony was excluded just as
they did for Dr. Colditz.165 The experts in the New Jersey case were evaluated under the Kemp
Standard meaning Judge Johnson needed to evaluate whether the theory of causation was
acceptable under the standard.166 The Kemp Standard was considered more relaxed than the
Daubert Standard in that “a theory of causation that had not yet reached general acceptance in
the scientific community ‘may be found to be sufficiently reliable if it is based on a sound,
adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the type
reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field.’"167
Dr. Cramer’s testimony also regarded general and specific causation of ovarian cancer.168
Dr. Cramer, like Dr. Colditz, was one of plaintiffs’ main experts and the court expressed
disappointment with the evidence put forth claiming the witness was “dismissive of anything but
epidemiological studies” and only used certain case-control studies.169 The court did note how
impressive Dr. Cramer’s background is, pointing out the case-control studies the expert has
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authored, but found his methodology problematic under the admissibility standard.170 The court
found Dr. Cramer disregarded certain studies that did not further his opinions and incorrectly
utilized the Bradford Hill Criteria by ignoring unfavorable results.171
The exclusion of Dr. Cramer’s testimony in one court and the inclusion of his testimony in
another demonstrates the quantifiable issue with the different expert admissibility standards as
well as the different ways the courts apply the Daubert Standard. While no damages were
ultimately awarded in the South Dakota District Court Case, Dr. Cramer also testified in the
Missouri state case that awarded the plaintiff $55 million in damages.172 The difference between
a summary judgement motion, like in New Jersey, and a multimillion dollar verdict, like in other
courts across the country, presents a puzzling issue that often stems from expert admissibility.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is another Talc Case pending in the District of New Jersey.173 It is a multidistrict
litigation overseen by Judge Freda Wolfson.174 In July and August of 2019, both Plaintiffs’
Steering Committee and Johnson & Johnson presented experts at Daubert Hearings.175 The
decision on the experts admissibility was not yet been released at the time this comment was
written. The decision is expected to impact talc cases across the country but has much larger
implications regarding the Daubert Standard.176 Only eight of the thirty-nine experts challenged
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testified during the eight-day Daubert Hearings.177 Many of the experts have also been
challenged, admitted, and testified in other talc cases across the country, such as Dr. William
Longo.178 Should the District of New Jersey decision exclude frequently used – and commonly
challenged – experts like Dr. Longo, it would further cast light on the lack of uniformity when
applying Daubert as well as other expert admissibility standards.
While it is beyond the scope of this comment to suggest a perfect solution for the issues
surrounding the Daubert Standard and other expert admissibility standards, there are many
suggestions floating around the legal profession. Suggestions include overturning Kumho Tire,
hosting science days in court to aid the presiding judge and having access to a science panel
among others.179 Science days and panels however do not solve one of the main issues raised in
this comment. Perhaps a lack of scientific understanding contributes to the expert admissibility,
but the standards themselves should be held accountable before the judges employing them.
Judges must work with what they are given through precedent and expert reports. As reflected in
the case studies, each determination to admit or exclude an expert was well within the bounds of
the expert admissibility standard employed. The issue is in the flexibility of the standards and
the vastly different standards which exist between state courts and even among the circuit courts.
As noted, the Eighth Circuit created its own take on the Daubert Standard and as a result the
district courts within the Eighth Circuit have followed suit. In addition, because the Daubert
Standard came before the amendment to Fed. R. Evid. 702, the door is still open for some courts

177

Amanda Bronstad, MDL Judge Reviews Expert Evidence Over Talc's Ties to Ovarian Cancer, LAW.COM NEW
JERSEY LAW JOURNAL (July 24, 2019), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2019/07/24/mdl-judge-reviews-expertevidence-over-talcs-ties-to-ovarian-cancer/.
178
Daniel Fisher, Johnson & Johnson says crucial expert for talc plaintiffs lied on stand, LEGAL NEWSLINE (May 7,
2019), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/512480634-johnson-johnson-says-crucial-expert-for-talc-plaintiffs-lied-onstand.
179
Izabelle Tully, The Courtroom Turned Classroom: A Model Procedure for Educating the Gatekeepers of Expert
Evidence in Complex Toxic Tort Cases, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2405, 2436 (2019).

29

to apply the old rule. The Daubert Standard was a step towards clarifying the gatekeeping role
judges play but as seen in the talc litigation, the different standards and applications still need to
be addressed. As evidenced by the talc litigation, a more guided approach to expert admissibility
is necessary. That is not to say the standard must be stricter, however setting forth more
guidelines judges are required to follow, rather than just factors that may be considered or may
be weighed, would plausibly aid in reducing the drastically different outcomes seen in the talc
litigation as a result of excluding and admitting the same expert testimony in different courts.
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